We study a dynamic market with asymmetric information that creates the lemons problem. We compare e¢ ciency of the market under di¤erent assumptions about the timing of trade. We identify positive and negative aspects of dynamic trading, describe the optimal market design under regularity conditions and show that continuous-time trading can be always improved upon.
Introduction
Consider liquidity-constrained owners who would like to sell assets to raise capital for profitable new opportunities. Adverse selection, as in Akerlof (1970) , means that if owners have private information about value trade will be ine¢ cient, even in competitive markets. In this paper we show how that ine¢ ciency is a¤ected by market design in terms of when the sellers can trade.
In Akerlof (1970) the seller makes only one decision: to sell the asset or not. However, in practice, if the seller does not sell immediately, there are often future opportunities to trade.
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screening via costly delay increases in some instances overall liquidity of the market: more types eventually trade in a dynamic trading market than in the static/restricted trading market. On the negative side, future opportunities to trade reduce the amount of early trade, making the adverse selection problem worse. There are two related reasons. First, keeping the time 0 price …xed, after a seller decides to reject it, buyers update positively about the value of the asset and hence the future price is higher. That makes it desirable for some seller types to wait. Second, the types who wait are a better-than-average selection of the types were supposed to trade at time 0 in a static model and hence this additional adverse selection reduces p 0 : In turn, even more types wait, reducing e¢ ciency further.
We study di¤erent ways of designing the market in terms of picking the times when the market opens. For example, we compare e¢ ciency of a continuously opened market to a design in which the seller can trade only once at t = 0 and otherwise has to wait until the type is revealed at some T (we allow the asymmetric information to be short-lived, T < 1;
as well as fully persistent, T = 1): 1 We motivate our analysis by an example with linear valuations (the value to buyers is a linear function of the seller value) and uniform distribution of seller types. We show that the market with restricted trading opportunities (allowing trades only at t = 0 and at T ) is on average more e¢ cient than a market with continuous-time trading. In fact, for large T the deadweight loss caused by adverse selection is three times as large if continuous trading is allowed. It may appear that preventing costly screening/signaling could always be welfareimproving as in the education signaling models (Spence 1973) . Via a di¤erent example we show that this is not always true: since in a market for lemons immediate e¢ cient trade is not possible, in some situations screening via costly delay can help welfare.
Our main result (Theorem 1) shows that we can always improve upon a continuous trading market design. In particular, we show that introducing a "lock-up" period, that is allowing the seller to trade at t = 0 and then closing the market for some (small) time window, followed by continuous trading, is welfare improving. Said di¤erently, there always exist restrictions on trading opportunities that improve welfare.
Under some fairly standard regularity conditions we can signi…cantly strengthen our result.
In Theorem 2 we show that making the "lock up" last from immediately after the …rst opportunity to trade until the time information arrives (or never allowing trade again if no information ever arrives) generates higher expected gains from trade than any other market timing design not just the continuous trading benchmark. 1 In Section 6.2 we consider information arriving at random time.
For both of these results, and the recommended policy implications, it is of course important to be able to identify in practice what time zero in the model corresponds to. Our model shares this issue with any model in which time on the market plays a signaling role.
In practice, identifying the time the gains from trade arise (say, because the seller is hit by a liquidity need) might not always be easy. Certain occasions might nonetheless provide a good proxy. For example, in a widespread …nancial crises, capital requirements are likely to become binding for several …nancial institutions and this is often publicly observed. Merril et. al (2013) show that the willingness to sell residential mortgage backed securities by insurance companies can be partly explained by the severity with which their capital constraints were binding. Another example is that …rms that enter into bankruptcy commonly divest non-core assets and could use costly delay to signal the value of those assets. For such situations, our model suggests that to maximize expected gains from trade there should be an organized auction early in the bankruptcy process and that creditors might want to subsidize trades that take place in this auction and dissuade future opportunities to trade these assets.
Our …ndings that restrictions to future trading improve welfare bring up an important practical issue: can the involved parties credibly commit to keeping the market closed in the future. As we point out in Remark 2, one way to achieve such commitment is to make trades completely anonymous, so that past buyers could re-sale the asset if the market becomes active without their counterparties knowing whether they are facing the original seller or a previous buyer. If this is implemented then buyers would be discouraged to purchase the asset after time zero since they would face additional adverse selection. As a result, the seller would not be able to get a higher price if he delays transaction (unless he waits till the information arrives) and the gains from trade we describe in this paper would be realized.
We then consider an alternative design: what if market is opened continuously until some time interval before information arrives? We show that this design has qualitatively di¤erent consequences than the "lock-up" period in which market is closed after the initial trade opportunity at t = 0: The reason is that closing the market before T creates an additional endogenous market closure. If the last opportunity to trade before T is at t , in equilibrium there is an additional time interval (t ; t ) such that nobody trades even though trades are allowed. The intuition is that failing to trade at t implies a strictly positive delay cost for the seller and as a result an atom of types trades at t : That reduction in adverse selection allows the buyers to o¤er a good price. In turn, waiting for this good price makes the adverse selection right before t so extreme that the market freezes. This additional delay cost can completely undo the e¢ ciency gains that accrue at t -we argue that such short closures have a very small impact on total welfare and that the overall e¤ect can be either positive or negative.
Next we discuss how our …ndings can be applied to inform government policy. When information frictions get really bad, the government may consider a direct intervention (beyond trying to regulate the dynamic trading). We have seen several of these interventions during the recent …nancial crisis. For example, the government could guarantee a certain value of traded assets (this was done with the debt issues by several companies and as part of some of the takeover deals of …nancially distressed banks). Alternatively, the government could directly purchase some of the assets (for example, real estate loan portfolios from banks as has been done in Ireland and is being discussed as a remedy for the Spanish banking crisis).
We point out an important equilibrium e¤ect that seems to be absent of many public discussions about such government bailouts. It is not just the banks that participate in the asset buyback or debt guarantee programs that bene…t from the government's intervention.
The whole …nancial sector bene…ts because liquidity is restored to markets. As a result, non-lemons manage to realize higher gains from trade thanks to the intervention. We relate our …ndings to the recent work by Philippon and Skreta (2012) and Tirole (2012) . We argue that unlike in their static-market analysis, the government can improve welfare by a comprehensive intervention which involves not only assets buy-backs but also restricts the post-intervention private markets. Finally, we point out that expectation of an asset buyback (or any other intervention that leads to an atom of types trading) in the near term may drastically reduce liquidity as in the "late closure" market design, partially undermining the bene…ts of that intervention.
Related Literature
Our paper is related to literature on dynamic markets with adverse selection. The closest paper is Janssen and Roy (2002) who study competitive equilibria in a market that opens at a …xed frequency (and long-lived private information, T = 1): In equilibrium prices increase over time and eventually every type trades. They point out that the outcome is still ine¢ cient even as per-period discounting disappears (which is equivalent to taking a limit to continuous trading in our model) since trade su¤ers from delay costs even in the limit.
They do not ask market design questions as we do in this paper (for example, what is the optimal frequency of opening the market). Yet, we share with their model the observation that dynamic trading with T = 1 leads to more and more types trading over time. For other papers on dynamic signaling/screening with a competitive market see Noldeke and van Damme (1990), Swinkels (1999) , Kremer and Skrzypacz (2007) and Daley and Green (2011) . While we share with these papers an interest in dynamic markets with asymmetric information, none of these papers focuses on market design questions.
From the mechanism-design perspective, a closely related paper is Samuelson (1984) . It characterizes a welfare-maximizing mechanism in the static model subject to no-subsidy constraints. When T = 1; this static mechanism design is mathematically equivalent to a dynamic mechanism design since choosing probabilities of trade is analogous to choosing delay. Therefore our proof of Theorem 2 uses the same methods as Samuelson (1984) .
As we mentioned already, our paper is also related to Philippon and Skreta (2012) and Tirole (2012) who study mechanism design (i.e. government interventions) in the presence of a market ("competitive fringe"). Our focus is on a di¤erent element of market design, but we also discuss how these two approaches can be combined. Our analysis can be described as "design of timing" in the sense that we compare equilibrium outcomes for markets/games that di¤er in terms of the time when players move. That is related in spirit to Damiano, Li and Suen (2012) , who study optimal delay in committee decisions where the underlying game resembles a war of attrition.
A di¤erent design question for dynamic markets with asymmetric information is asked in (2012)). Rather than having just one market in which di¤erent quality sellers sell at di¤erent times, the separation of types in these models is achieved because market di¤er in market tightness with the property that in a market with low prices a seller can …nd a buyer very quickly and in a market with high prices it takes a long time to …nd a buyer. Low-quality sellers which are more eager to sell quickly self-select into the low price market while high quality sellers are happy to wait longer in the high price market. One can relate our design questions to a search setting by studying the e¢ ciency consequences of closing certain markets (for example, using a price ceiling). This would roughly correspond to closing the market after some time in our setting.
The Model
As in the classic market for lemons, a potential seller owns one unit of an indivisible asset.
When the seller holds the asset, it generates for him a revenue stream with net present value c 2 [0; 1] that is private information of the seller. The seller's type, c; is drawn from a distribution F (c) ; which is common knowledge, atomless and has a continuous, strictly positive density f (c). At time T 1 the seller's type is publicly revealed. 3 There is a competitive market of potential buyers. Each buyer values the asset at v (c) which is strictly increasing, twice continuously di¤erentiable, and satis…es v (c) > c for all c < 1 (i.e. common knowledge of gains from trade) and v (1) = 1 (i.e. no gap on the top).
These assumptions imply that in the static Akerlof (1970) problem some but not all types trade in equilibrium. 4 Time is t 2 [0; 1] and we consider di¤erent market designs in which the market is opened in di¤erent moments in that interval. We start the analysis with two extreme market designs:
"infrequent trading" (or "restricted trading") in which the market is opened only twice at t 2 f0; T g and "continuous trading" in which the market is opened in all t 2 [0; T ] : Note that the …rst time the market opens after the private information is revealed trade will take place immediately with probability 1. Let All players discount payo¤s at a rate r and we let = Conditions (1) and (2) are standard. Condition (3) deserves a bit of explanation. We justify it by a market clearing reasoning, that demand equals supply given the prices. In particular, suppose the asset was o¤ered at a price p t < v (k t ) at time t: Then, since all buyers believe that the value of the good is at least v (k t ) ; they would all demand it.
Demand could not be equal to supply, the market could not clear. This condition removes some trivial multiplicity of equilibria. For example, it removes as a candidate equilibrium a path (p t ; k t ) = (0; 0) for all periods (i.e. no trade and very low prices) even though this path satis…es the …rst two conditions. 8 We assume that all market participants publicly observe all the trades. Hence, once a buyer obtains the asset, if he tries to put it back on the market, the market makes a correct inference about c based on the history. Since we assume that all buyers have the same value of the asset, there would not be any pro…table re-trading of the asset (after the initial seller transacts) and hence we ignore that possibility (however, see Remark 2). ; as illustrated in Figure 1 :
5 Since we know that the skimming property holds in this environment it is simpler to directly de…ne the competitive equilibrium in terms of cuto¤s. 6 In continuous time we use a convention
7 Implicitly, we require that the price process is such that an optimal seller strategy exists. 8 Condition (3) is analogous to the condition (iv) in Janssen and Roy (2002) and is weaker than the No Unrealized Deals condition in Daley and Green (2011) (see De…nition 2.1 there; since they study the gap case, they need a stronger condition to account for out-of-equilibrium beliefs). the equilibrium path converges to the competitive equilibrium we identify for the continuous trading design. In other words, the equilibria we describe in this section have a game-theoretic foundation.
Infrequent Trading
The infrequent trading market design corresponds to the classic market for lemons as in Akerlof (1970) . The equilibrium in this case is described by a price p 0 and a cuto¤ k 0 that satisfy that the cuto¤ type is indi¤erent between trading at t = 0 and waiting till T :
and that the buyers break even on average:
The solution is k 0 = : The expected gains from trade are
With infrequent trading, I ; for general f and v we have the following characterization of equilibria:
9 Proposition 1 (Infrequent/Restricted Trading) For I = f0; T g there exists a competitive equilibrium fp 0 ; k 0 g : Equilibria are a solution to:
is strictly decreasing, the equilibrium is unique.
Continuous Trading
The above outcome cannot be sustained in equilibrium if there are multiple occasions to trade before T: If at t = 0 types below k 0 trade, the next time the market opens price would be at least v (k 0 ) : If so, types close to k 0 would be strictly better o¤ delaying trade. As a result, for any set richer than I , in equilibrium there is less trade in period 0.
If we look at the case of continuous trading, C = [0; T ] ; then the equilibrium with continuous trade is a pair of two processes fp t ; k t g that satisfy:
The intuition is as follows. Since the process k t is continuous, the zero pro…t condition is that the price is equal to the value of the current cuto¤ type. The second condition is the indi¤erence of the current cuto¤ type between trading now and waiting for a dt and trading at a higher price. These conditions yield a di¤erential equation for the cuto¤ type
with the boundary condition k 0 = 0: In our example it has a simple solution:
The total surplus from continuous trading is
For general f and v; with continuous trading opportunities C ; the equilibrium is unique:
T ] a competitive equilibrium (unique up to measure zero of times) is the unique solution to:
Comparing Infrequent and Continuous trading
The graph below (left) compares the dynamics of trade (prices and cuto¤s) in these two How do gains from trade compare in these two cases? Figure 3 shows the ratio
where S F B is the trade surplus if trade was e¢ cient, while S I and S C are the trade surpluses computed above. The ratio represents the relative e¢ ciency loss from adverse selection in these two markets:
When ! 0 (i.e. as rT ! 1, the private information is long-lived) we get
so the e¢ ciency loss with continuous trading is three times higher than with infrequent trading.
When ! 1 (i.e. T ! 0 so the private information is very short-lived), the organization of the market does not matter since even by waiting till T players can achieve close to full e¢ ciency in either case.
What a¤ects relative e¢ ciency of the two market designs? The trade-o¤ is as follows.
Committing to only one opportunity to trade generates a big loss of surplus if players do not reach an agreement in the current period. This clearly leaves a lot of unrealized gains from trade. But it is this ine¢ ciency upon disagreement that helps overcome the adverse selection problem and increases the amount of trade in the initial period. Continuous trading on the other hand does not provide many incentives to trade in the current period since a seller su¤ers a negligible loss of surplus from delay. This leads to an equilibrium with smooth trading over time. While the screening of types via delay is costly, the advantage is that eventually (if T is large enough) more types trade. In determining which trading environment is more e¢ cient on average, one has to weight the cost of delaying trade with low types with the advantage of eventually trading with more types.
Can Continuous Trading be Better?
Our example above demonstrates a case of v (c) and F (c) such that for every T the infrequent trading market is more e¢ cient than the continuous trading market. Furthermore, the greater the T , the greater the e¢ ciency gains from using infrequent trading. Is it a general phenomenon? The answer is no:
Proposition 3 There exist v (c) and F (c) such that for T large enough the continuous trading market generates more gains from trade than the infrequent trading market
The example used in the proof of this proposition illustrates what could make the continuous trading market to dominate the infrequent one: we need a large mass at the bottom of the distribution, so that the infrequent trading market gets "stuck" with only these types trading, while under continuous trading these types trade quickly, so the delay costs for these types are small. Additionally, we need some mass of higher types that would be reached in the continuous trading market after some time, generating additional surplus. Alternatively, one can construct examples in which the gains from trade are small for low types and get large for intermediate types, so that some delay cost at the beginning is more than compensated by the increased overall probability of trade.
Optimality of Restricting Trading Opportunities

General Market Designs
So far we have compared only the continuous trading market with the infrequent trading.
But one can imagine many other ways to organize the market. For example, the market could clear every day; or every 2 (0; T ) : Or the market could be opened at 0; then closed for some time interval and then be opened continuously. Or, the market could start being opened continuously and close some before T (i.e. at t = T ): In this section we consider some of these alternative designs.
Closing the Market Brie ‡y after Initial Trade.
Our main result follows. We show that continuous-trading market is never an optimal design.
In particular, consider the design
trade is allowed at t = 0; then the market is closed till > 0 and then it is opened continuously till T: We call this design "early closure". We show that one can always …nd > 0 that improves upon continuous To establish that early closure increases e¢ ciency of trade we show in the proof an even stronger result: that for small with EC there is more trade overall and all types that trade trade sooner, so social surplus is higher type-by-type. Let k EC be the highest type that trades at t = 0 when the design is EC : Let k C the equilibrium cuto¤ at time in design C : We establish this stronger claim by showing that for small ; k C < k EC : Since with EC once the market re-opens at the equilibrium is the same as in case of C but with the di¤erent boundary condition, the claim follows.
The proof proceeds by showing that:
Since as ! 0 both k EC and k C converge to 0; this means that for small approximately twice as many types trade before if the market is closed than if it is opened in (0; ) :
The intuition is as follows. When we close the market for some time, some types that were planning to trade in (0; ) now would prefer to trade at 0 even if the price at 0 does not change: The reason is that not taking the price p 0 implies a …xed delay cost. It turns out that the set of types that decide to take that …xed p 0 grows approximately as fast in as
That early closure doubles early trade is then acheived because pooling of trade at time 0 reduces the adverse selection that buyers face and hence price p 0 increases. For small the price is approximately half way between v (0) and v k EC (since we assumed that f (c) and v (c) are positive and continuous, we can use the linear-uniform approximation as in the example in Section 3). As the price goes up, even more types prefer to trade at 0 and the adverse selection problem is reduced even further, making p 0 even higher, and so on.
Becasue prices grow at half the speed of v k C , the k EC is twice as high as k C :
When Infrequent Trading is Optimal
We showed above that it is never optimal to have the market continuously open. Namely A su¢ cent condition for our result is:
De…nition 1 We say that the environment is regular if
A su¢ cient condition is that v 00 (c) 0 and
(v (c) c) is decreasing. This regularity condition is similar to the standard condition in optimal auction theory/pricing theory that the virtual valuation/marginal revenue curve be monotone. In particular, think about a static problem of a monopsonist buyer choosing a cuto¤ (or a probability to trade, F (c));
by making a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er equal to P (c) = (1 ) c + v (c) : In that problem
decreasing guarantees that the marginal pro…t crosses zero exactly once. 10 10 The FOC of the monopolist problem choosing c is:
Theorem 2 If the environment is regular then infrequent trading, I = f0; T g ; generates higher expected gains from trade than any other market design.
Our proof considers a relaxed mechanism design problem with a market maker who maximizes expected gains from trade. The designer is allowed to cross-subsidize buyers trading in di¤erent periods (other than at T ) but has to break even (only) on average. 11 . We show that the regularity condition is su¢ cient for the solution to the relaxed problem to be that types below a threshold trade immediately and types above the threshold wait till T; with no trade in the middle. That solution to the relaxed problem can be implemented by a competitive equilibrium and hence I design is the most e¢ cient (in case design I leads to multiple equilibria, our theorem applies to the one in which the threshold k 0 is the highest).
If the solution to the relaxed problem does not have the property that all trade happens only at t = 0 or t = T; then it involves the cross-subsidization of the buyers and the allocation of the relaxed mechanism cannot be implemented as a competitive equilibrium without the use of taxes and subsidies.
It is an open question how to solve for the optimal if the solution to the relaxed problem calls for trade in more than one period. The di¢ culty is that the constraints on the mechanism are then endogenous. A mechanism that calls for a set of types to trade at time t has to have a price equal to the average v (c) across these types. Hence, as changes (or the range of the allocation function changes), the set of constraints changes as well.
Commitment to Infrequent Trading Although, as we have shown above, it might be optimal to commit to having just a unique trading opportunity ex-post (after time 0) there is an incentive to trade again immediately rather than waiting all the way until time T: Hence an important practical question is if indeed these trading restrictions can be implemented or not. If indeed there was no commitment power and no credible way of stopping parties from trading, then sellers and buyers would recognize this and the equilibrium would be the one with continuous trading opportunities that we know is ine¢ cient. From a market design perspective this paper highlights that it is important to try to …gure out credible ways in which to restrict trading opportunities.
In the following Remark we propose Extreme Anonymity of the market as one possible Also note if F (c) is log-concave then
F (c) is decreasing. 11 For T = 1; this is a problem analyzed in Samuelson (1984) . Our contribution is that we analyze a general T and provide su¢ cient conditions for the solution to have no trade in (0; T ) : Also, he studies probability of trade in a static mechanism design and we look at the timing of trade in a dynamic setting albeit these two problems are tightly connected.
way in which we might organize information to achieve an e¤ective market closure even in the case in which the market cannot be physically closed.
Remark 2 One way to implement I = f0; T g in practice may be via an Extreme Anonymity of the market. In our model we have assumed that the initial seller of the asset can be told apart in the market from buyers who later become secondary sellers. However, if the trades are completely anonymous, even if 6 = f0; T g ; the equilibrium outcome would coincide with the outcome for I . The reason is that the price can never go up since otherwise the early buyers of the low-quality assets would resell them at the later markets.
Such extreme anonymity may not be feasible in some markets (for example, IPO's), or not practical for reasons outside the model. Yet, it may be feasible in some situations. For example, a government as a part of an intervention aimed at improving e¢ ciency of the market may create a trade platform in which it would act as a broker who anonymizes trades and traders.
Closing the Market Brie ‡y before Information Arrives
The …nal design we consider is the possibility of keeping the market opened continuously from t = 0 till T and then closing it till T: Such a design seems realistic and in some practical situations may be easier to implement than EC because it may be easier to determine when some private information is expected to arrive (i.e. when t = T ) than when it is that the seller of the asset is hit by liquidity needs (i.e. when t = 0):
The comparison of this "late closure" market with the continuous trading market is much more complicated than in Section 4.1.1 for two related reasons. First, if the market is closed from T to T; there will be an atom of types trading at T : As a result, there will be a "quiet period" before T : there will be some time interval [t ; T ] such that despite the market being open, there will be no types that trade on the equilibrium path in that time period. The equilibrium outcome until t is the same in the "late closure" as in the continuous trading design, but diverges from that point on. That brings the second complication: starting at time t ; the continuous trading market bene…ts from some types trading earlier than in the "late closure" market. Therefore it is not su¢ cient to show that by T there are more types that trade in the late closure market. We actually have to compare directly the total surplus generated between t and T: These two complications are not present when we consider the "early closure" design since there is no t before t = 0 for the earlier trade to be a¤ected by the early closure.
The equilibrium in the "late closure" design is as follows. Let p T ; k T and t be a solution to the following system of equations:
where the …rst equation is the zero-pro…t condition at t = T ; the second equation is the indi¤erence condition for the highest type trading at T and the last equation is the indi¤erence condition of the lowest type that reaches T ; who chooses between trading at t and at T : The equilibrium for the late closure market is then:
1) at times t 2 [0; t ] ; (p t ; k t ) are the same as in the continuous trading market
Condition (6) guarantees that given the constant price at times t 2 (t ; T ) it is indeed
optimal for the seller not to trade. There are other equilibria that di¤er from this equilibrium in terms of the prices in the "quiet period" time: any price process that satis…es in this time
satis…es all our equilibrium conditions. Yet, all these paths yield the same equilibrium outcome in terms of trade and surplus (of course, the system (4) (6) may have multiple solutions that would have di¤erent equilibrium outcomes).
Despite this countervailing ine¢ ciency, for our leading example: The gains from bringing forward trades that occur when the market is exogenously closed in t 2 (9; 10) (i.e. the jump in types at t = 0:9) are partially o¤set by the delay of types in the endogenous quiet period t 2 (8:23; 9). If we close the market for t 2 (0; ) instead, there is no loss from some types postponing trade because there is no time before 0.
The intuition why the gains (if any) are in general very small is that we prove that the endogenous quiet period is on the same order as : The reasoning in Theorem 1 implies that the jump in types at time T is approximately twice as large as the continuous increase in the cuto¤ when the market is opened continuously over a time interval of length : Putting these two observations together implies that the …nal cuto¤ at time T is approximately (using a …rst-order approximation in ) the same for these two designs, as seen in Figure 4 . Hence, any welfare e¤ects are tiny. What we can show is that there are cases when some restrictions to continuous trading, even small, can reduce welfare. An example of such a situation is f (c) = 2 2c and v (c) = c + 1: In this case, by direct calculations we can show that "late closure" reduces expected gains from trade: The intuition is that even though the gains from trade are constant across all types, since f (c) is decreasing, the distribution assigns a higher weight to the types that delay in the endogenous "quiet period" than to the types that speed up thanks to the closure.
Implications for Asset Purchases by the Government
Market failure due to information frictions sometimes calls for government intervention.
During the recent …nancial crisis several markets e¤ectively shut down or became extremely illiquid. One of the main reasons cited for this was the realization by market players that the portfolios of asset backed securities that banks held were not all investment grade as initially thought. Potential buyers of these securities which used to trade them without much concern suddenly became very apprehensive of purchasing these assets for the potential risk of buying a lemon. The Treasury and the Federal Reserve tried many di¤erent things to restore liquidity into the markets. Some of the measures were aimed at providing protection against downside risk via guarantees e¤ectively decreasing the adverse selection problem or by removing the most toxic assets from the banks'balance sheets (for example, via the TARP I and II programs or central banks'acceptance of toxic assets as collateral).
Our model provides a natural framework to study the potential role for government. To illustrate consider the case in which if v (c) = c for 2 > > 1 and F (c) = c: 12 Then for all the unique equilibrium is for there never to be any trade before the information is revealed.
So the market is completely illiquid and no gains from trade are realized. The government could intervene in this market by making an o¤er p g > 0 to buy any asset sellers are willing to sell at that price (these programs are by and large voluntary).
In this example, the average quality of these assets will be We want to make two observations about this intervention. First, in the post-intervention, continuously-opened market the liquidity is characterized by (3) which in this example simpli…es to:
Therefore, the larger the initial intervention, the faster the trade in the free market afterwards. Second, this government intervention bene…ts not only the direct recipients of government funds but also all other sellers since by reducing the adverse selection problem in the market they will now have an opportunity trade with a private counterparty.
Optimal government interventions in very similar (though richer) models have been studied recently by Philippon and Skreta (2012) and Tirole (2012) . In these papers the government o¤ers …nancing to …rms having an investment opportunity and it is secured by assets that the …rms have private information about. That intervention is followed by a static competitive market in which …rms that did not receive funds from the government can trade privately. This creates a problem of "mechanism design with a competitive fringe" as named by Philippon and Skreta (2012) .
The setup in these two papers can be roughly mapped to ours if we assume v (c) c = . easier for the government to intervene. However, these two papers argue that this is never a good idea.
Our results show that taking into account the dynamic nature of the market changes this conclusion. In particular, the assumptions in Tirole (2012) satisfy the assumptions in Theorem 2 (he assumes
is decreasing). Therefore it would be optimal for the government to concentrate post-intervention trades to be right after it and commit to shutting down the market afterwards. This could be achieved by organizing a market at t = 0; o¤ering a subsidy to trades and announcing that all trades afterwards will be taxed. Alternatively, o¤ering (partial) insurance for assets traded at a particular time window but not later. Finally, creating an anonymous exchange (see Remark 2) may be a practical solution.
Additionally, our analysis of the late closure suggests that if the market expects the government may run a program of that nature in near future, the market may close endogenously, even if trade would continue if no such intervention were expected. The reasoning is the same: if a non-trivial fraction of seller types participate in the government transaction, the post-intervention price is going to be strictly higher than the current cuto¤'s v (k t ) and hence there are no trades that could be pro…table for both sides.
Discussion
In this section we explore a few extensions of the model.
High Frequency Trading
High frequency trading has recently receives increased attention by both policy makers and researchers. 14 
Stochastic Arrival of Information
So far we have assumed that it is known that the private information is revealed at T: However, in some markets, even if the private information is short-lived, the market participants may be uncertain about the timing of its revelation.
To capture that idea we have analyzed a version of our model in which there is no …xed time T information is revealed, so that [0; 1] ; but over time, with a constant Poisson rate exogenous information arrives that publicly reveals the seller's type. We assume that for any ; once the information arrives trade is immediate at price p = v (c) :
14 See for example Pagnotta and Philippon (2012) The following results can be established for this model:
1. If = [0; 1] then for all the equilibrium is as described in Proposition 2.
2. Theorem 1 holds.
is decreasing then the analog of Theorem 2 holds (i.e., with this new condition replacing the regularity condition, fully restricting trade between t = 0 and the time information is revealed maximizes total surplus.
The proofs of these claims are analogous to the proofs in the original and hence are omitted (but they are available from the authors upon request). The intuition why the equilibrium path of prices and cuto¤s before information arrives is the same in the stochastic and deterministic arrival of information cases is as follows. In the deterministic case, the bene…t of delaying trade by dt is that the price increases by _ p t dt: In the stochastic case, the price also increases, but additionally with probability dt the news arrives. If so, the current cuto¤ type gets a price v (k t ) instead of p t+dt : However, since p t = v (k t ) ; price p t+dt is only of order dt higher than what the current cuto¤ gets upon arrival. Therefore, the additional e¤ect of delaying trade is a term on the order of dt 2 and so with continuous trading it does not a¤ect incentives to delay, and so the equilibrium path of cuto¤s is unchanged.
To illustrate the model with random arrival, return to our benchmark example with v (c) = and F (c) = c: In the infrequent trading market, the equilibrium (p 0 ; k 0 ) is determined by:
where the …rst equation is the indi¤erence condition of the cuto¤ type and the second equation is the usual zero-pro…t condition. In our example we get
We now can compare the gains from trade. The total gains from trade in the infrequent trading market are:
In the continuous trading market (since the path of types is the same as we computed before) the gains are:
where (c) =
is the time type c trades if there is no arrival before (c) : Direct calculations yield:
where z r : So, for every ; the infrequent trading market is more e¢ cient than the continuous trading market, consistent with the analog of Theorem 2.
Beyond Design of : A¤ecting T
In this paper we analyze di¤erent choices of : A natural question is what else could a market designer a¤ect to improve the market e¢ ciency. One such possibility is information structure, as we have discussed in Remark 2. There are of course other options for changing information (for example, should past rejected o¤ers be observed or not?), but that is beyond the scope of this paper.
Another possibility is a¤ecting T: Clearly, if the market designer could make T very small, it would be good for welfare since it would make the market imperfections short-lived. That may not be feasible though. Suppose instead that the designer could only increase T (for example, by making some veri…cation take longer). 15 Surprisingly, it turns out that in some cases increasing T could improve e¢ ciency. While it is never bene…cial in the continuoustrading case (since it does not a¤ect trade before T and only delays subsequent trades), it can help in other cases. To illustrate it, Figure 5 increasing T is welfare improving. 15 We thank Marina Halac for suggesting this question. 
Common Knowledge of Gains from Trade
We have assumed that v (0) > 0 and v (1) = 1; that is, strictly positive gains from trade for the lowest type and no gains on the top: Can we relax these assumptions? The main reason we assume v (1) = 1 is that in this way we do not need to de…ne equilibrium market prices after histories where the seller trades with probability 1: That is, when v (1) = 1; the highest type never trades in equilibrium no matter how large is T . This makes our de…nition of competitive equilibrium simpler than in Daley and Green (2011) (compare our condition (3) "Market Clearing" with De…nition 2.1 there).
To illustrate how the freedom in selecting o¤-equilibrium-path beliefs can lead to a multiplicity of equilibria with radically di¤erent outcomes consider the following heuristic rea-soning. Assume:
Suppose that = f0; ; 2 ; :::; T g for > 0: Let s > 1 2 so that in a static problem trade would be e¢ cient.
Case 1: Assume that when an o¤er that all types accept on the equilibrium path is rejected, buyers believe the seller has the highest type, c = 1. That is, post-rejection price is 1 + s: Then, taking a sequence of equilibria as ! 0; we can show that in the limit trade is smooth over time (no atoms) with:
On equilibrium path all types trade by: top is small so that for a given T in equilibrium it is not possible that all types trade before T; then our analysis still applies.
Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed a dynamic market with asymmetric information. Our two main results are that, …rst, under mild regularity conditions restricting trade to I = f0; T g dominates any other design. Second, even more generally, e¢ ciency can be improved over continuous-time trading by the "early closure" design which after initial auction restricts additional trading for some interval of time. We discussed how these …ndings can inform government policy geared towards resolving market failures due to the lemons problem.
Unlike the previous papers using a static model of the market, we argue that an intervention would be more successful if the government could at least partially restrict dynamic trading after the intervention. The bottom line is that we have identi…ed a non-trivial cost to Finally, in our model there were only two sources of signaling: delay and the exogenous signal that arrives only once. In many markets sellers may want to wait for multiple pieces of news to arrive over time before they agree to sell (as in Daley and Green 2011) , and a market designer may try to in ‡uence both the timing of possible trades and the timing of information release.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. 1) Existence. The equilibrium conditions follow from the de…nition of equilibrium. To see that there exists at least one solution to (1) and (2) note that if we write the condition for the cuto¤ as:
then the LHS is continuous in k 0 ; it is positive at k 0 = 0 and negative at k 0 = 1: So there exists at least one solution. 16 2) Uniqueness. To see that there is a unique solution under the two assumptions, note that the derivative of the LHS of (7) at any k is
When we evaluate it at points where (7) holds, the derivative is
and that is by assumption decreasing in k:
Suppose that there are at least two solutions and select two: the lowest k L and secondlowest k H : Since k L is the lowest solution, at that point the curve on the LHS of (7) must have a weakly negative slope (since the curve crosses zero from above): However, our assumption implies that curve has even strictly more negative slope at k H . That leads to a contradiction 
and these types would strictly prefer to trade at t = s 1 than to wait till s 2 ; a contradiction again.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider a distribution that approximates the following: with probability " c is drawn uniformly on [0; 1] ; with probability (1 ") it is uniform on [0; "] ;
and with probability ( 
Proof of Theorem 1. To establish that early closure increases e¢ ciency of trade we show an even stronger result: that for small with EC there is more trade at t = 0 than with C by t = : Let k EC be the highest type that trades at t = 0 when the design is EC : Let k C the equilibrium cuto¤ at time in design C : Then the stronger claim is that for small
it is su¢ cient for us to rank:
Step 1: Characterizing lim !0
Consider EC : When the market reopens at t = the market is continuously open from then on. Hence, the equilibrium in the continuation game is the same as the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 2 albeit with a di¤erent starting lowest type. Namely, for t
with a boundary condition:
The break even condition for buyers at t = 0 implies:
and type k EC must be indi¤erent between trading at this price at t = 0 or for p = v k
Using implicit function theorem we can show that:
(because we have assumed that f (c) and v (c) are positive and continuous). so the bene…t of waiting, the left-hand side
while the cost of waiting, the right-hand side of (8) ; is approximately r v (0) so k EC for small solves approximately
which yields
Step 2: Characterizing lim !0
Consider C : Since k t is de…ned by the di¤erential equation
for small :
and more precisely:
Summing up steps 1 and 2, we have:
Proof of Theorem 2. We use mechanism design to establish the result. Consider the following relaxed problem. There is a mechanism designer who chooses a direct revelation mechanism that maps reports of the seller to a probability distribution over times he trades and to transfers from the buyers to the mechanism designer and from the designer to the seller. The constraints on the mechanism are: incentive compatibility for the seller (to report truthfully); individual rationality for the seller and buyers (the seller prefers to participate in the mechanism rather than wait till T and get v (c) and the buyers do not lose money on average); and that the mechanism designer does not lose money on average. Additionally, we require that the highest type, c = 1; does not trade until T (as in any equilibrium he does not).
For every game with a …xed , the equilibrium outcome can be replicated by such a mechanism, but not necessarily vice versa, since if the mechanism calls for the designer cross-subsidizing buyers across periods, it cannot be replicated by a competitive equilibrium.
Within this class of direct mechanisms we characterize one that maximizes ex-ante expected gains from trade. We then show that is the environment is regular, infrequent trading replicates the outcome of the best mechanism and hence any other market design generates lower expected gains from trade.
A general direct revelation mechanism can be described by 3 functions x (c) ; y (c) and P (c) ; where y (c) is the probability that the seller will not trade before information is released, x (c) is the discounted probability of trade over all possible trading times and P (c)
is the transfer received by the seller conditional on trading before information is released. 
Clearly, the mechanism designer will leave the buyers with no surplus (since he could use it to increase e¢ ciency of trade) and so maximizing S is the designer's objective. That also means that the no-losses-on-average constraint is: 
We now optimize (11) subject to (12) ; ignoring necessary monotonicity constraints on x (c) and y (c) that assure that reporting c truthfully is incentive compatible (we check later that they are satis…ed in the solution).
The derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect to x (c) and y (c) are: seller. This is also the equilibrium condition in a market with design = f0; T g ; so that equilibrium implements the solution to the relaxed problem.
Proof of Proposition 4. so we get that for small ; the "late closure" market generates slightly higher expected surplus, but the e¤ects are really small.
